When setting a breakpoint on the console.log statement, why would this be undefined in the debugger but the statement print with no issues? Am I missing something in regards to scope here?
export class OptionsSidebarComponent {
...
public filters: Object = new Object();
...
public generateFilters() {
for (let property in this.terms) {
if (this.terms.hasOwnProperty(property) && this.terms[property] !== null) {
if (!this.filters.hasOwnProperty(this.productGroup.id)){
this.filters[this.productGroup.id] = new Filters();
}
this.terms[property].forEach((term) => {
console.log(this.filters);
});
}
}
}
}
With typescript While debugging, keep in mind that transpilers can rename variables. Using the original name in the console without sourcemaps that include renaming will show you undefined even if the original value isn't. Make sure you use the transpiled name in watches or console commands.
When you're referencing this with your console.log statement inside its own class, you're using it in its relevant scope. Depending on the framework you are using, different terms are used to reference your class... AngularJS used $scope- Angular 2+ uses this to reference the current class (or current scope/context).
When you use this in your debugger you're using it outside of its scope. It no longer references the class you intend it to.
Each one of your components in Angular uses this to reference itself. Here's an article to explain in further detail: https://angular-2-training-book.rangle.io/handout/features/refresher_on_this.html
If we simplify it to basic javascript and look at your class as just a function a good example would be this:
function example(){
var anything = 10;
console.log(anything); //output: 10
}
console.log(anything); //undefined! we're out of scope :)
So looking at it from this perspective, this is nothing magical. It's just provided to us by Angular to make our references to other things inside our components easier.
Probably many of you tried to achieve encapsulation in JavaScript. The two methods known to me are:
a bit more common I guess:
var myClass(){
var prv //and all private stuff here
//and we don't use protoype, everything is created inside scope
return {publicFunc:sth};
}
and second one:
var myClass2(){
var prv={private stuff here}
Object.defineProperty(this,'prv',{value:prv})
return {publicFunc:this.someFunc.bind(this)};
}
myClass2.prototype={
get prv(){throw 'class must be created using new keyword'},
someFunc:function(){
console.log(this.prv);
}
}
Object.freeze(myClass)
Object.freeze(myClass.prototype)
So, as second option is WAY more convenient to me (specifically in my case as it visually separates construction from workflow) the question is - are there any serious disadvantages / leaks in this case? I know it allows external code to access arguments of someFunc by
myClass.protoype.someFunc.arguments
but only in case of sloppily executed callbacks (synchronously inside caller chain). Calling them with setTimeout(cb,0) breaks chain and disallows to get arguments as well as just returning value synchronously. At least as far as i know.
Did I miss anything? It's kind of important as code will be used by external, untrusted user provided code.
I like to wrap my prototypes in a module which returns the object, this way you can use the module's scope for any private variables, protecting consumers of your object from accidentally messing with your private properties.
var MyObject = (function (dependency) {
// private (static) variables
var priv1, priv2;
// constructor
var module = function () {
// ...
};
// public interfaces
module.prototype.publicInterface1 = function () {
};
module.prototype.publicInterface2 = function () {
};
// return the object definition
return module;
})(dependency);
Then in some other file you can use it like normal:
obj = new MyObject();
Any more 'protecting' of your object is a little overkill for JavaScript imo. If someone wants to extend your object then they probably know what they're doing and you should let them!
As redbmk points out if you need private instance variables you could use a map with some unique identifier of the object as the key.
So, as second option is WAY more convenient to me (specifically in my case as it visually separates construction from workflow) the question is - are there any serious disadvantages / leaks in this case?
Hm, it doesn't really use the prototype. There's no reason to "encapsulate" anything here, as the prototype methods will only be able to use public properties - just like your untrusted code can access them. A simple
function myClass2(){
var prv = // private stuff here
Object.defineProperty(this, 'prv', {value:prv})
// optionally bind the publicFunc if you need to
}
myClass2.prototype.publicFunc = function(){
console.log(this.prv);
};
should suffice. Or you use the factory pattern, without any prototypes:
function myClass2(){
var prv = // private stuff here
return {
prv: prv,
publicFunc: function(){
console.log(this.prv); // or even just `prv`?
}
};
}
I know it allows external code to access arguments of someFunc by
myClass.protoype.someFunc.arguments
Simply use strict mode, this "feature" is disallowed there.
It's kind of important as code will be used by external, untrusted user provided code.
They will always get your secrets if the code is running in the same environment. Always. You might want to try WebWorkers instead, but notice that they're still CORS-privileged.
To enforcing encapsulation in a language that doesn't properly support private, protected and public class members I say "Meh."
I like the cleanliness of the Foo.prototype = { ... }; syntax. Making methods public also allows you to unit test all the methods in your "class". On top of that, I just simply don't trust JavaScript from a security standpoint. Always have security measures on the server protecting your system.
Go for "ease of programming and testing" and "cleanliness of code." Make it easy to write and maintain, so whichever you feel is easier to write and maintain is the answer.
Background
I just learned that calling keys(window) (or Object.keys(window)) in the DevTools console reveals variables in the global scope (source). I called that code on the StackOverflow page and got this result:
Variable i got my attention as it seems to be in the global scope by a mistake. I tried locating code that is responsible for declaring i, but it turned out to be cumbersome (there is a lot of code and a lot of is).
Question
Getting console warnings that say
Global variable "i" created (main.js:342)
could be useful. How can I implement that feature?
Research
I figured that I need some kind of an event whenever new variable is created.
We do have setters in JavaScript. However, creating a setter requires that you provide a property name. Since I want to monitor all properties I can't really use that.
__noSuchMethod__ (MDN) would be perfect but it only covers methods (and there is no __noSuchProperty__ method).
Object.observe (HTML5 Rocks) doesn't reveal anything about the code that created the property (console.trace() gives me only the name of the observer function).
Object.prototype.watch (MDN) - same as the setter, you have to specify a property name.
Calling Object.preventExtensions(window) (MDN) causes errors with a nice stack trace whenever new global variable is created. The problem with this solution is that it interferes with the script execution and may change its behaviour. It also doesn't allow me to catch the error and format it properly.
Notes
I know about jshint/jslint and I still think that catching these declarations in the runtime could be useful.
I don't care about i variable on the SO page that much, you can probably find the declaration using setters. My question concerns the general solution for this problem.
IMO you have two decent options:
JSHint.
Strict mode.
Both will yell at you when you leak a global. Strict mode will probably be better for your usecases.
You've definitely done your homework, and you thought of all the things I would have thought of and, as you discovered, none of them fit.
The only way I can think of doing is to just monitor the global object (this example is using window as the global object: modify accordingly for Node or another JavaScript container). Here's an example that monitors new globals and deleted globals (if you don't need to monitor deletions, you can remove that functionality):
var globals = Object.keys(window);
var monitorGlobalInterval = 50;
setInterval(function(){
var globalsNow = Object.keys(window);
var newGlobals = globalsNow.filter(function(key){
return globals.indexOf(key)===-1;
});
var deletedGlobals = globals.filter(function(key){
return globalsNow.indexOf(key)===-1;
});
newGlobals.forEach(function(key){
console.log('new global: ' + key);
});
deletedGlobals.forEach(function(key){
console.log('global deleted: ' + key);
});
globals = globalsNow;
}, monitorGlobalInterval);
See it in action here: http://jsfiddle.net/dRjP9/2/
You can try this method to get a list of global variables that you've created:
(function(){
var differences = {},
ignoreList = (prompt('Ignore filter (comma sep)?', 'jQuery, Backbone, _, $').split(/,\s?/) || []),
iframe = document.createElement('iframe'),
count = 0; ignoreList.push('prop');
for (prop in window) {
differences[prop] = {
type: typeof window[prop],
val: window[prop]
}; count++;
}
iframe.src = 'about:blank';
iframe.style.display = 'none';
document.body.appendChild(iframe);
iframe = iframe.contentWindow || iframe.contentDocument;
for (prop in differences) {
if (prop in iframe || ignoreList.indexOf(prop) >= 0) {
delete differences[prop];
count--;
}
}
console.info('Total globals: %d', count);
return differences;
})();
So, I just noticed today that you can apparently run javascript in the chrome console. I had no idea you could do this. It's actually really cool.
In my rails app, I have an external javascript page. Some of the variables on that page I would like to be global so that all the functions in the JS file can access them. for example I have a map, and I would like the map object to be global in the javascript file because that way all my functions access the one map variable instead of creating their own, and I can break complex operations down into smaller functions.
This is all well and good I know how to do that and it's working perfectly. My problem now, can I protect the variables from outside? For example you can change the values of all the javascript class variables from the chrome console.. as well methods from for example the map are accessible and excecutable.. I have locked the map settings on one of the pages so it is not zoomable or movable, however from the console I can simply say map.setZoom(11) and the map will zoom to 11.. I can type map.dragable = true and bam u can drag the map.. I don't like this really..
It's not too terribly bad yet like the user enabling map drag and zoom isnt the worst thing in the world.. but still I'd like to disable this. Any ideas?
EDIT
Thanks all for the answers and comments. I guess I will just resort to not putting anything that can be turned malicious into my javascript, and do thing like pass my map variable to functions where necessary to slow people down.
You can use an immediately-invoked function (IIFE) expression to prevent your variables and functions from being exposed in the global scope:
var a = 10;
(function() {
var b = 20;
})();
window.a lets you view and modify a, but you cannot do that with b:
Try it out here
I'm more than sure that there's a way to edit b with Inspector, but I haven't taken the time to figure it out. Don't waste your time trying to prevent your users from modifying code that they can view.
You can't. Even if you wrap them into anonymous functions, user can get to them through debugger. As last resort he can simply intercept your traffic to his own machine and replace your JavaScript with something else.
Bottom line: JavaScript in browser is client-side. Client can do whatever he pleases with it.
Try doing something like this:
(function(){
//All of your current code
})();
One thing to still be aware of - Chrome developer tools also lets you edit the javascript (not the javascript file on the server, just currently running copy.) Go to Chrome Dev Tools->Sources and you can edit the javascript files.
You can't. Your saying you need to define your map globally, this means it's accessible for everyone.
You could define your map in a different scope and then only define the "public" things:
(function() {
var map = new Map();
window.myMap = {
goTo: function(lat, lng) {
map.goTo(lat, lng);
}
};
})();
Depending on your architecture, there are a few ways to accomplish this. Use this method to create a reusable component that has public and private properties:
var protectedScope = function () {
var protected_var = 'protected';
this.showProtected = function () {
return protected_var;
}
this.public = 'public';
};
var myObject = new protectedScope();
console.log('Public var: '+myObject.public); // outputs "public"
console.log('Protected via accessor: '+myObject.showProtected ()); // outputs "private"
console.log('Protected var: '+myObject.protected); // outputs undefined
Any variable or function declared with a var keyword will be, in effect, private. Any variable or function that uses the this.name mechanism will be "public".
Understand that this structure is not truly public or private, such concepts are not a part of the language. There are still ways to get at those variables, and one can always view source. Just be clear; this is a code organization concept rather than a security concept. Chrome has had this developer console for a while, and other major user agents are moving to include similar tools (or already have done so). There are also tools like Firebug which allow a user full access to your javascript runtime environment. This isn't a realm that the developer can control at all.
Try it here: http://jsfiddle.net/cf2kS/
More Reading
"Private Members in JavaScript" by Douglas Crockford* - http://www.crockford.com/javascript/private.html
"OOP in JS, Part 1 : Public/Private Variables and Methods" on http://phrogz.net - http://phrogz.net/JS/classes/OOPinJS.html
Javascript Object Management on MDN - https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/XUL_School/JavaScript_Object_Management
Closures on MDN - https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/JavaScript/Guide/Closures
Object.defineProperty(map, 'zoom', {value:1});
or
Object.defineProperty(map, 'zoom',{
set: function(){console.warn('Access denied!');},
get: function(){return 1;}
});
demo
or
Object.defineProperty(Object.prototype, 'protect', {
value: function(ignore){
var childObjects = [], ignore = ignore || [];
ignore.push(this);
if(this instanceof MimeType)return; //Chrome Fix //window.clientInformation.mimeTypes[0].enabledPlugin[0] !== window.clientInformation.mimeTypes[0]
for(var prop in this){
if(typeof this[prop] === "unknown")continue; //IE fix
if(this[prop] instanceof Object){
var skip = false;
for(var i in ignore)
if(ignore[i]===this[prop]){
skip = true;
break;
}
if(!skip)childObjects.push(prop);
}
var d = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(this, prop);
if(!d || !d.configurable || !d.writable)continue;
var that = this;
(function(){
var temp = that[prop];
delete that[prop];
Object.defineProperty(that, prop,{
set: function(){console.warn('Access denied!');},
get: function(){return temp;}
});
})();
}
for(var i = 0;i<childObjects.length;i++)
this[childObjects[i]].protect(ignore);
}
});
this.onload=function(){this.protect();} //example
demo
I'm wondering if it's possible to sandbox JavaScript running in the browser to prevent access to features that are normally available to JavaScript code running in an HTML page.
For example, let's say I want to provide a JavaScript API for end users to let them define event handlers to be run when "interesting events" happen, but I don't want those users to access the properties and functions of the window object. Am I able to do this?
In the simplest case, let's say I want to prevent users calling alert. A couple of approaches I can think of are:
Redefine window.alert globally. I don't think this would be a valid approach because other code running in the page (i.e., stuff not authored by users in their event handlers) might want to use alert.
Send the event handler code to the server to process. I'm not sure that sending the code to the server to process is the right approach, because the event handlers need to run in the context of the page.
Perhaps a solution where the server processes the user defined function and then generates a callback to be executed on the client would work? Even if that approach works, are there better ways to solve this problem?
Google Caja is a source-to-source translator that "allows you to put untrusted third-party HTML and JavaScript inline in your page and still be secure."
Have a look at Douglas Crockford's ADsafe:
ADsafe makes it safe to put guest code (such as third party scripted advertising or widgets) on any web page. ADsafe defines a subset of JavaScript that is powerful enough to allow guest code to perform valuable interactions, while at the same time preventing malicious or accidental damage or intrusion. The ADsafe subset can be verified mechanically by tools like JSLint so that no human inspection is necessary to review guest code for safety. The ADsafe subset also enforces good coding practices, increasing the likelihood that guest code will run correctly.
You can see an example of how to use ADsafe by looking at the template.html and template.js files in the project's GitHub repository.
I created a sandboxing library called jsandbox that uses web workers to sandbox evaluated code. It also has an input method for explicitly giving sandboxed code data it wouldn't otherwise be able to get.
The following is an example of the API:
jsandbox
.eval({
code : "x=1;Math.round(Math.pow(input, ++x))",
input : 36.565010597564445,
callback: function(n) {
console.log("number: ", n); // number: 1337
}
}).eval({
code : "][];.]\\ (*# ($(! ~",
onerror: function(ex) {
console.log("syntax error: ", ex); // syntax error: [error object]
}
}).eval({
code : '"foo"+input',
input : "bar",
callback: function(str) {
console.log("string: ", str); // string: foobar
}
}).eval({
code : "({q:1, w:2})",
callback: function(obj) {
console.log("object: ", obj); // object: object q=1 w=2
}
}).eval({
code : "[1, 2, 3].concat(input)",
input : [4, 5, 6],
callback: function(arr) {
console.log("array: ", arr); // array: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
}
}).eval({
code : "function x(z){this.y=z;};new x(input)",
input : 4,
callback: function(x) {
console.log("new x: ", x); // new x: object y=4
}
});
An improved version of RyanOHara's web workers sandbox code, in a single file (no extra eval.js file is necessary).
function safeEval(untrustedCode)
{
return new Promise(function (resolve, reject)
{
var blobURL = URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([
"(",
function ()
{
var _postMessage = postMessage;
var _addEventListener = addEventListener;
(function (obj)
{
"use strict";
var current = obj;
var keepProperties =
[
// Required
'Object', 'Function', 'Infinity', 'NaN', 'undefined', 'caches', 'TEMPORARY', 'PERSISTENT',
// Optional, but trivial to get back
'Array', 'Boolean', 'Number', 'String', 'Symbol',
// Optional
'Map', 'Math', 'Set',
];
do
{
Object.getOwnPropertyNames(current).forEach(function (name)
{
if (keepProperties.indexOf(name) === -1)
{
delete current[name];
}
});
current = Object.getPrototypeOf(current);
}
while (current !== Object.prototype)
;
})(this);
_addEventListener("message", function (e)
{
var f = new Function("", "return (" + e.data + "\n);");
_postMessage(f());
});
}.toString(),
")()"],
{type: "application/javascript"}));
var worker = new Worker(blobURL);
URL.revokeObjectURL(blobURL);
worker.onmessage = function (evt)
{
worker.terminate();
resolve(evt.data);
};
worker.onerror = function (evt)
{
reject(new Error(evt.message));
};
worker.postMessage(untrustedCode);
setTimeout(function ()
{
worker.terminate();
reject(new Error('The worker timed out.'));
}, 1000);
});
}
Test it:
https://jsfiddle.net/kp0cq6yw/
var promise = safeEval("1+2+3");
promise.then(function (result) {
alert(result);
});
It should output 6 (tested in Chrome and Firefox).
As mentioned in other responces, it's enough to jail the code in a sandboxed iframe (without sending it to the server-side) and communicate with messages.
I would suggest to take a look at a small library I created mostly because of the need to providing some API to the untrusted code, just like as described in the question: there's an opportunity to export the particular set of functions right into the sandbox where the untrusted code runs. And there's also a demo which executes the code submitted by a user in a sandbox:
http://asvd.github.io/jailed/demos/web/console/
I think that js.js is worth mentioning here. It's a JavaScript interpreter written in JavaScript.
It's about 200 times slower than native JavaScript, but its nature makes it a perfect sandbox environment. Another drawback is its size – almost 600 KB, which may be acceptable for desktops in some cases, but not for mobile devices.
All the browser vendors and the HTML5 specification are working towards an actual sandbox property to allow sandboxed iframes -- but it's still limited to iframe granularity.
In general, no degree of regular expressions, etc. can safely sanitise arbitrary user provided JavaScript as it degenerates to the halting problem :-/
An ugly way, but maybe this works for you:
I took all the globals and redefined them in the sandbox scope, as well I added the strict mode so they can't get the global object using an anonymous function.
function construct(constructor, args) {
function F() {
return constructor.apply(this, args);
}
F.prototype = constructor.prototype;
return new F();
}
// Sanboxer
function sandboxcode(string, inject) {
"use strict";
var globals = [];
for (var i in window) {
// <--REMOVE THIS CONDITION
if (i != "console")
// REMOVE THIS CONDITION -->
globals.push(i);
}
globals.push('"use strict";\n'+string);
return construct(Function, globals).apply(inject ? inject : {});
}
sandboxcode('console.log( this, window, top , self, parent, this["jQuery"], (function(){return this;}()));');
// => Object {} undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined
console.log("return of this", sandboxcode('return this;', {window:"sanboxed code"}));
// => Object {window: "sanboxed code"}
https://gist.github.com/alejandrolechuga/9381781
An independent JavaScript interpreter is more likely to yield a robust sandbox than a caged version of the built-in browser implementation.
Ryan has already mentioned js.js, but a more up-to-date project is JS-Interpreter. The documentation covers how to expose various functions to the interpreter, but its scope is otherwise very limited.
As of 2019, vm2 looks like the most popular and most regularly-updated solution to running JavaScript in Node.js. I'm not aware of a front-end solution.
With NISP you'll be able to do sandboxed evaluation.
Though the expression you write is not exactly JavaScript code, instead you'll write S-expressions. It is ideal for simple DSLs that doesn't demand extensive programming.
Suppose you have code to execute:
var sCode = "alert(document)";
Now, suppose you want to execute it in a sandbox:
new Function("window", "with(window){" + sCode + "}")({});
These two lines when executed will fail, because "alert" function is not available from the "sandbox"
And now you want to expose a member of window object with your functionality:
new Function("window", "with(window){" + sCode + "}")({
'alert':function(sString){document.title = sString}
});
Indeed you can add quotes escaping and make other polishing, but I guess the idea is clear.
Where is this user JavaScript code coming from?
There is not much you can do about a user embedding code into your page and then calling it from their browser (see Greasemonkey). It's just something browsers do.
However, if you store the script in a database, then retrieve it and eval() it, then you can clean up the script before it is run.
Examples of code that removes all window. and document. references:
eval(
unsafeUserScript
.replace(/\/\/.+\n|\/\*.*\*\/, '') // Clear all comments
.replace(/\s(window|document)\s*[\;\)\.]/, '') // Removes window. Or window; or window)
)
This tries to prevent the following from being executed (not tested):
window.location = 'http://example.com';
var w = window;
There are a lot of limitations you would have to apply to the unsafe user script. Unfortunately, there isn't any 'sandbox container' available for JavaScript.
I've been working on a simplistic JavaScript sandbox for letting users build applets for my site. Although I still face some challenges with allowing DOM access (parentNode just won't let me keep things secure =/), my approach was just to redefine the window object with some of its useful/harmless members, and then eval() the user code with this redefined window as the default scope.
My "core" code goes like this... (I'm not showing it entirely ;)
function Sandbox(parent){
this.scope = {
window: {
alert: function(str){
alert("Overriden Alert: " + str);
},
prompt: function(message, defaultValue){
return prompt("Overriden Prompt:" + message, defaultValue);
},
document: null,
.
.
.
.
}
};
this.execute = function(codestring){
// Here some code sanitizing, please
with (this.scope) {
with (window) {
eval(codestring);
}
}
};
}
So, I can instantiate a Sandbox and use its execute() function to get code running. Also, all new declared variables within eval'd code will ultimately bound to the execute() scope, so there will not be clashing names or messing with existing code.
Although global objects will still be accessible, those which should remain unknown to the sandboxed code must be defined as proxies in the Sandbox::scope object.
You can wrap the user's code in a function that redefines forbidden objects as parameters -- these would then be undefined when called:
(function (alert) {
alert ("uh oh!"); // User code
}) ();
Of course, clever attackers can get around this by inspecting the JavaScript DOM and finding a non-overridden object that contains a reference to the window.
Another idea is scanning the user's code using a tool like JSLint. Make sure it's set to have no preset variables (or: only variables you want), and then if any globals are set or accessed do not let the user's script be used. Again, it might be vulnerable to walking the DOM -- objects that the user can construct using literals might have implicit references to the window object that could be accessed to escape the sandbox.