Django-tinymce not working; Getting a normal textarea instead - javascript

I'm trying to use django-tinymce to make fields that are editable through Django's admin with a TinyMCE field. I am using tinymce.models.HTMLField as the field for this.
The problem is it's not working. I get a normal textarea. I check the HTML source, and it seems like all the code needed for TinyMCE is there. I also confirmed that the statically-served JavaScript file is indeed being served. But for some reason it isn't working.
What I did notice though, is that if I avoid setting TINYMCE_COMPRESSOR = True in the settings file, it does start to work. What can cause this behavior?

What are your webserver and web browser. Perhaps it is trying to set the gzip/bzip header and the server isn't processing it... so it goes out plaintext but the client expects compressed?

Related

Figuring out source of programmatic content [duplicate]

I have a weird network request in my page, which refers to JavaScript files, which I removed from every html file earlier. Cache is cleared and there is no single reference to be found in the source html and the JavaScript files. For fixing that and also out of general curiosity I would like to know if there is a simple way to find out where a request was triggered, preferably using the chrome-devtools.
Update:
Thanks to jaredwilli I found the initator column under the network-tab. However this only shows Other. What I would like to know, is the (html or javascript) file where those Requests have been triggered.
On the Network panel, you can determine what the initiator of a request was by viewing the Initiator column. It gives you the file, line number and type of resource it was, either Script or something else.

Preventing 'content-sniffing' type vulnerabilities when handling user-uploaded images?

The problem:
I work on an internal tool that allows users to upload images - and then displays those images back to them and others.
It's a Java/Spring application. I have the benefit of only needing to worry about IE11 exactly and Firefox v38+ (Chrome v43+ would be a nice to have)
After first developing the feature, it seems that users can just create a text file like:
<script>alert("malicious code here!")</script>
and save it as "maliciousImage.jpg" and upload it.
Later, when that image is displayed inside image tags like:
<img src="blah?imgName=foobar" id="someImageID">
actualImage.jpg displays normally, and maliciousImage.jpg displays as a broken link - and most importantly no malicious content is interpreted!
However If the user right-clicks on this broken link, and clicks 'view image'... bad things happen.
the browser does 'content-sniffing' a concept which is new to me, detects that 'maliciousImage.jpg' is actually a text file, and very kindly renders it as HTML without hesitation. Any script tags are passed to the JavaScript interpreter and, as you can imagine, we don't want this.
What I've tried so far
In short, every possible combination of response headers I can think of to prevent the browser from content-sniffing. All the answers I've found here on stackoverflow, and other docs, imply that setting the content-type header should prevent most browsers from content-sniffing, and setting X-content options should prevent some versions of IE.
I'm setting the x-content-type-options to no sniff, and I'm setting the response content type. The docs I've read lead me to believe this should stop content-sniffing.
response.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
response.setContentType("image/jpg");
I'm intercepting the response and these headers are present, but seem to have no effect on how the malicious content is processed...
I've also tried detecting which images are and are not malicious at the point of upload, but I'm quickly realizing this is very much non-trivial...
End goal:
Naturally - any output at all for images that aren't really images (garbled nonsense, an unhandled exception, etc) would be better than executing the text-file as HTML/javascript in the clear, but displaying any malicious HTML as escaped/CDATA'd plain-text would be ideal... though maybe a bit impractical.
So I ended up fixing this problem but forgot to answer my own question:
Step 1: blocking invalid images
To get a quick fix out, I simply added some fairly blunt code that checked if an image was actually an image - during upload and before serving it, using the imageio lib:
import javax.imageio.ImageIO;
//......
Image img = attBO.getImage(imgId);
InputStream x = new ByteArrayInputStream(img.getData());
BufferedImage s;
try {
s = ImageIO.read(x);
s.getWidth();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new myCustomException("Invalid image");
}
Now, initially i'd hoped that would fix my problem - but in reality it wasn't that simple and just made generating a payload more difficult.
While this would block:
<script>alert("malicious code here!")</script>
It's very possible to generate a valid image that's also an XSS payload - just a little more effort....
Step 2: framework silliness
It turned out there was an entire post-processing workflow that I'd never touched, that did things such as append tokens to response bodies and use additional frameworks to decorate responses with CSS, headers, footers etc.
This meant that, although the controller was explicitly returning image/png, it was being grabbed and placed (as bytes) post processing was taking that bytestream, and wrapping it in a header and footer, to form a fully qualified 'view' - this view would always have the 'content-type' text/html and thus was never displayed correctly.
The crux of this problem was that my controller was directly returning an image, in a RESTful fashion, when the rest of the framework was built to handle controllers returning full fledged views.
So I had to step through this workflow and create exceptions for the controllers in my code that returned something other than worked in a restful fashion.
for example with with site-mesh it was just an exclude(as always, simple fix once I understood the problem...):
<decorators defaultdir="/WEB-INF/decorators">
<excludes>
<pattern>*blah.ctl*</pattern>
</excludes>
<decorator name="foo" page="myDecorator.jsp">
<pattern>*</pattern>
</decorator>
and then some other other bespoke post-invocation interceptors.
Step 3: Content negotiation
Now, I finally got the stage where only image bytecode was being served and no review was being specified or explicitly generated.
A Spring feature called 'content negotiation' kicked in. It tries to reconcile the 'accepts' header of the request, with the 'messageconverters' it has on hand to produce such responses.
Because spring by default doesn't have a messageconverter to produce image/png responses, it was falling back to text/html - and I was still seeing problems.
Now, were I using spring 4, I could've simply added the annotation:
#Produces("image/png")
to my controller - simple fix...
Step 4: Legacy dependencies
but because I only had spring 3.0.5 (and couldn't upgrade it) I had to try other things.
I tried registering new messageconverters but that was a headache or adding a new post-method interceptor to simply change the content-type back to 'image/png' - but that was a hacky headache.
In the end I just exposed the request/reponse in the controller, and wrote my image directly to the response body - circumventing Spring's content-negotiation altogether
....and finally my image was served as an image and displayed as an image - and no injected code was executed!
That sounds odd, because it works perfectly elsewhere. Are you sure the X-Content-Type-Options header is present in the responses?
Here is a demo I built a while back, where I have a file that's a valid html, gif and javascript. As you can see it first loads as an HTML, but then loads itself as an image and as a script (which executes):
http://research.insecurelabs.org/content-sniffing/gifjs.html
However if you load it using the "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff" header, the script no longer executes:
http://research.insecurelabs.org/content-sniffing/nosniff/gifjs.html
Btw, the image renders properly in FF/IE, but not in Chrome.
Here is a demo, where I attempted what you described:
http://research.insecurelabs.org/content-sniffing/stackexchange.html
First image is without nosniff, and second is with, and it seems to work as intended. Second one does not run the script when opened with "view image".
Edit:
Firefox doesn't seem to support X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
So, you should also add "Content-disposition: attachment;filename=image.gif" or similar to the images. The image will load normally if loaded through an image tag, but if you open the URL directly, you will force a download instead of showing the image directly in the browser.
Example: http://research.insecurelabs.org/content-sniffing/attachment/
adeneo is pretty much spot-on. You should use whatever image library you want to check if the uploaded file is a valid file for the type it claims to be. Anything the client sends can be manipulated.

Input/Pass an Image into an input type="filename" directly from Javascript

I'm trying to pass files directly to an input type="filename" control element so I don't have to manually click [browse] and search for a file. I'm not trying to bypass any type of security or anything like that, i'm just trying to "imitate" the clicking of the browse putting and selecting an image without actually having to search for the file in the BROWSE FOR FILES dialog.
I'm wanting to do this directly through javascript.
Now some of you may be wondering "why the crap are you trying to do that?" well my employer has a website that he has to upload images of daily reports to and they use the standard
<input type="hidden" name="fileInput">
He wanted me to try and make a program that just does it for him and will just auto upload the files for him and all he has to do is hit submit at the end.
Is this possible?
EDIT#
I was thinking I needed to pass it the image in raw data:image/jpeg;base64 then pass it to the control somehow?
EDIT#2
What about doing something like
javascript:(function() { document.forms[0].file.value+='" + theFile + "';})()
Edit#3
From what I been looking into I guess the only possible thing is to try and do a straight HTTP Post with a MultiPart Entity. I guess this is the only way to go about doing it and its impossible to do anything directly from Javascript itself.
Would figure that since is considered a HTML object that javascript would be able to touch it. Kinda of weird that you can't.
This is similar to another question I answered recently. Basically, it is not possible. Even though you aren't trying to bypass security, it could be used to bypass security. Any and every time a webpage wants to access your files, the user must be alerted.

How to capture a complete webpage using javascript

I inject javascript code into a page user is currently viewing, on users command this script make DOM changes. At the end of this interaction user might want to save the page so that s/he can view/edit it later. I could remember the DOM changes that user made, But if the original page(at its source) is changed, I will not be able to restore this page for user. That is why I want to send the changed page to my server. I should be able to restore it completely and the page should behave exactly the way it did(including scripts and media).
Additionally I can not store media of users page at my end(resource limitation), so I guess I have to parse and modify all addresses/references/links of media to global URL/URI in various scripts(HTML/CSS/JavaScript).
Now the question is, Is there a library/framework/jquery extension that can help me achieve this objective ?
else, What is the right/professional way to do it ?
Since you are using jQuery you could try $("html").html(); just make sure to add the appropriate <html> tags when you output it again.
$('body').html()
$('head').html()
$('html').html()
Download firebug, and try it in the console window on this page. I am getting what looks like the correct data back.
Have I got It right that you are building some kind of CMS that let's the user edit entire pages (Not just seperate content blocks) in Contenteditable mode?
I would definatly advise looking at a solution like ckeditor/tinymce etc... Because doing it all yourself will be a terrible pain.
The answer from #Sydenam should work fine to save the whole HTML page.
Meanwhile, and this is IMPORTANT, I would recommend you to consider a potential SECURITY ISSUE here. Indeed the user can inject whatever he wants in the DOM and have you saving it, like nasty Javascript functions sending confidential information on a remote server for example.
So, in my perspective, a professional way of doing this would be to dedicate a PART of the DOM only to that usage, let say a <div id='editable_div'> that you can load using a $('#editable_div').load('your_url',parameters, etc...), and save afterward using another AJAX call.
When saving it you can parse this chunk of HTML and make sure nothing nasty is inside with some regexp (like tags).
Hope it helps,
Regards,

Refused to execute a JavaScript script. Source code of script found within request

In WebKit I get the following error on my JavaScript:
Refused to execute a JavaScript script. The source code of script found within request.
The code is for a JavaScript spinner, see ASCII Art.
The code used to work OK and is still working correctly in Camino and Firefox. The error only seems to be thrown when the page is saved via a POST and then retrieved via a GET. It happens in both Chrome/Mac and Safari/Mac.
Anyone know what this means, and how to fix this?
This "feature" can be disabled by sending the non-standard HTTP header X-XSS-Protection on the affected page.
X-XSS-Protection: 0
It's a security measure to prevent XSS (cross-site scripting) attacks.
This happens when some JavaScript code is sent to the server via an HTTP POST request, and the same code comes back via the HTTP response. If Chrome detects this situation, the script is refused to run, and you get the error message Refused to execute a JavaScript script. Source code of script found within request.
Also see this blogpost about Security in Depth: New Security Features.
Short answer: refresh the page after making your initial submission of the javascript, or hit the URL that will display the page you're editing.
Long answer: because the text you filled into the form includes javascript, and the browser doesn't necessarily know that you are the source of the javascript, it is safer for the browser to assume that you are not the source of this JS, and not run it.
An example: Suppose I gave you a link your email or facebook with some javascript in it. And imagine that the javascript would message all your friends my cool link. So, the game of getting that link to be invoked becomes simply, find a place to send the javascript such that it will be included in the page.
Chrome and other WebKit browsers try to mitigate this risk by not executing any javascript that is in the response, if it was present in the request. My nefarious attack would be thwarted because your browser would never run that JS.
In your case, you're submitting it into a form field. The Post of the form field will cause a render of the page that will display the Javascript, causing the browser to worry. If your javascript is truly saved, however, hitting that same page without submitting the form will allow it to execute.
As others have said, this happens when an HTTP response contains a JavaScript and/or HTML string that was also in the request. This is usually caused by entering JS or HTML into a form field, but can also be triggered in other ways such as manually tweaking the URL's parameters.
The problem with this is that someone with bad intentions could put whatever JS they want as the value, link to that URL with the malicious JS value, and cause your users trouble.
In almost every case, this can be fixed by HTML encoding the response, though there are exceptions. For example, this will not be safe for content inside a <script> tag. Other specific cases can be handled differently - for example, injecting input into a URL is better served by URL encoding.
As Kendall Hopkins mentioned, there may be a few cases when you actually want JavaScript from form inputs to be executed, such as creating an application like JSFiddle. In those cases, I'd recommend that you you at least scrub through the input in your backend code before blindly writing it back. After that, you can use the method he mentioned to prevent the XSS blockage (at least in Chrome), but be aware that it is opening you to attackers.
I used this hacky PHP trick just after I commit to database, but before the script is rendered from my _GET request.:
if(!empty($_POST['contains_script'])) {
echo "<script>document.location='template.php';</script>";
}
This was the cheapest solution for me.

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