prepared statement / sql-injection preventation on variable from - javascript

I read about that prepare statments are a good way to avoid sql injections to databases.
the problem is the Customer wants a quiet variable UI
where he first selects a table, then some contraints consisting of a column and a text.
So basically the (naive) endproduct will look like this:
Select * from %TABLENAME% where %ATTRIBUTENAME% = %VALUE%
Now the question is how to get this secure?
I could, of course, build a prepare Statement solution where I create statements for all tables in advance, but that sounds to me like a pretty stupid idea, because the effort to maintain this would be quiet big (the customer has quiet a few tables).
Any idea how to solve this in a secure manner that is as generic as possible?

You should change your example to
select * from %TABLENAME% where %ATTRIBUTENAME% = ?
So that at least the VALUE can't be used for SQL injection. You could then have validation for TABLENAME and ATTRIBUTENAME against the known tables and columns in your database.
See DatabaseMetaData.getColumns(...) which you might use in your validation at runtime. Or perhaps you might keep a static file, generated at build time, with the valid tables/columns.
You could generate an Enum at build time for every table/column combination? I know jOOQ does this sort of build time java code generation from a db schema... perhaps it can help?
Eg
public enum TableColumn {
CUSTOMER_NAME("customer", "name"), CUSTOMER_ID("customer", "id"),
ORDER_ID("order", "id"), // etc etc
String table;
String column;
public TableColumn(String table, String column) {
// set values
}
}
public List<Row> doSelect(TableColumn tc, Object value) {
String sql = String.format("select * from %s where %s = ?", tc.table, tc.column);
Connection con = getConnection();
try {
PreparedStatement ps = con.prepareStatement(sql);
ps.setObject(1, value);
...

Related

How can I extend an SQL query in a variable?

I am testing possible SQL injections on my DB, and I am running a simple function to get results which a user should not be getting. The return value is correct based on id, however, the rest of the query is completely being ignored.
I want to return all the data from the data table.
Is there something wrong in my syntax?
Here is my implementation:
function test(id) {
db.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", [id], (err, result) => {
console.log(result[0]);
});
}
const id = "122 UNION SELECT * FROM data";
test(id);
This looks like nodejs Javascript with the npm mysql driver package. And, I guess your id column is defined as an INT or BIGINT, not as some kind of text string.
The way you use the .query() method is the correct way to prevent SQL injection. It's parameterized. That means each parameter in the SQL is represented by a ? placeholder. The second argument to .query() is an array of parameter values to substitute for the placeholders. For your use case the driver generates a query looking like this.
SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '122 UNION SELECT * FROM data'
and passes it to the MySQL server. The server then takes the string you passed and attempts to interpret it as a number. Due to a quirk in MySQL, it interprets your '122 UNION SELECT * FROM data' string as the number 122, and so looks up WHERE id = 122. (MySQL coerces strings to integers by looking for a leading number. So 123RedLight gives 123, and Hello gives 0. It can be confusing. Other makes and models of RDBMS throw errors when given strings where they expect integers.)
It correctly ignores the rest of your string.
If you wanted to make your code vulnerable to SQL injection (you do not want to do that!) you would write
function test(id) { /* danger: sql injection in next line */
db.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + id, (err, result) => { /* wrong ! */
console.log(result[0]);
});
}
This would send
SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = 122 UNION SELECT * FROM data
to the server, and give you your data leak.
You can't do it this way. In fact, not being able to do this is the WHOLE POINT of parameterized queries. It prevents an attacker from giving you a string like 122; DROP Table users; as the input.

PHP Delete Request [duplicate]

This question's answers are a community effort. Edit existing answers to improve this post. It is not currently accepting new answers or interactions.
If user input is inserted without modification into an SQL query, then the application becomes vulnerable to SQL injection, like in the following example:
$unsafe_variable = $_POST['user_input'];
mysql_query("INSERT INTO `table` (`column`) VALUES ('$unsafe_variable')");
That's because the user can input something like value'); DROP TABLE table;--, and the query becomes:
INSERT INTO `table` (`column`) VALUES('value'); DROP TABLE table;--')
What can be done to prevent this from happening?
The correct way to avoid SQL injection attacks, no matter which database you use, is to separate the data from SQL, so that data stays data and will never be interpreted as commands by the SQL parser. It is possible to create an SQL statement with correctly formatted data parts, but if you don't fully understand the details, you should always use prepared statements and parameterized queries. These are SQL statements that are sent to and parsed by the database server separately from any parameters. This way it is impossible for an attacker to inject malicious SQL.
You basically have two options to achieve this:
Using PDO (for any supported database driver):
$stmt = $pdo->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = :name');
$stmt->execute([ 'name' => $name ]);
foreach ($stmt as $row) {
// Do something with $row
}
Using MySQLi (for MySQL):
Since PHP 8.2+ we can make use of execute_query() which prepares, binds parameters, and executes SQL statement in one method:
$result = $dbConnection->execute_query('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = ?', [$name]);
while ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
// Do something with $row
}
Up to PHP8.1:
$stmt = $dbConnection->prepare('SELECT * FROM employees WHERE name = ?');
$stmt->bind_param('s', $name); // 's' specifies the variable type => 'string'
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();
while ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
// Do something with $row
}
If you're connecting to a database other than MySQL, there is a driver-specific second option that you can refer to (for example, pg_prepare() and pg_execute() for PostgreSQL). PDO is the universal option.
Correctly setting up the connection
PDO
Note that when using PDO to access a MySQL database real prepared statements are not used by default. To fix this you have to disable the emulation of prepared statements. An example of creating a connection using PDO is:
$dbConnection = new PDO('mysql:dbname=dbtest;host=127.0.0.1;charset=utf8mb4', 'user', 'password');
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES, false);
$dbConnection->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_ERRMODE, PDO::ERRMODE_EXCEPTION);
In the above example, the error mode isn't strictly necessary, but it is advised to add it. This way PDO will inform you of all MySQL errors by means of throwing the PDOException.
What is mandatory, however, is the first setAttribute() line, which tells PDO to disable emulated prepared statements and use real prepared statements. This makes sure the statement and the values aren't parsed by PHP before sending it to the MySQL server (giving a possible attacker no chance to inject malicious SQL).
Although you can set the charset in the options of the constructor, it's important to note that 'older' versions of PHP (before 5.3.6) silently ignored the charset parameter in the DSN.
Mysqli
For mysqli we have to follow the same routine:
mysqli_report(MYSQLI_REPORT_ERROR | MYSQLI_REPORT_STRICT); // error reporting
$dbConnection = new mysqli('127.0.0.1', 'username', 'password', 'test');
$dbConnection->set_charset('utf8mb4'); // charset
Explanation
The SQL statement you pass to prepare is parsed and compiled by the database server. By specifying parameters (either a ? or a named parameter like :name in the example above) you tell the database engine where you want to filter on. Then when you call execute, the prepared statement is combined with the parameter values you specify.
The important thing here is that the parameter values are combined with the compiled statement, not an SQL string. SQL injection works by tricking the script into including malicious strings when it creates SQL to send to the database. So by sending the actual SQL separately from the parameters, you limit the risk of ending up with something you didn't intend.
Any parameters you send when using a prepared statement will just be treated as strings (although the database engine may do some optimization so parameters may end up as numbers too, of course). In the example above, if the $name variable contains 'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees the result would simply be a search for the string "'Sarah'; DELETE FROM employees", and you will not end up with an empty table.
Another benefit of using prepared statements is that if you execute the same statement many times in the same session it will only be parsed and compiled once, giving you some speed gains.
Oh, and since you asked about how to do it for an insert, here's an example (using PDO):
$preparedStatement = $db->prepare('INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES (:column)');
$preparedStatement->execute([ 'column' => $unsafeValue ]);
Can prepared statements be used for dynamic queries?
While you can still use prepared statements for the query parameters, the structure of the dynamic query itself cannot be parametrized and certain query features cannot be parametrized.
For these specific scenarios, the best thing to do is use a whitelist filter that restricts the possible values.
// Value whitelist
// $dir can only be 'DESC', otherwise it will be 'ASC'
if (empty($dir) || $dir !== 'DESC') {
$dir = 'ASC';
}
To use the parameterized query, you need to use either Mysqli or PDO. To rewrite your example with mysqli, we would need something like the following.
<?php
mysqli_report(MYSQLI_REPORT_ERROR | MYSQLI_REPORT_STRICT);
$mysqli = new mysqli("server", "username", "password", "database_name");
$variable = $_POST["user-input"];
$stmt = $mysqli->prepare("INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES (?)");
// "s" means the database expects a string
$stmt->bind_param("s", $variable);
$stmt->execute();
The key function you'll want to read up on there would be mysqli::prepare.
Also, as others have suggested, you may find it useful/easier to step up a layer of abstraction with something like PDO.
Please note that the case you asked about is a fairly simple one and that more complex cases may require more complex approaches. In particular:
If you want to alter the structure of the SQL based on user input, parameterized queries are not going to help, and the escaping required is not covered by mysql_real_escape_string. In this kind of case, you would be better off passing the user's input through a whitelist to ensure only 'safe' values are allowed through.
Every answer here covers only part of the problem.
In fact, there are four different query parts which we can add to SQL dynamically: -
a string
a number
an identifier
a syntax keyword
And prepared statements cover only two of them.
But sometimes we have to make our query even more dynamic, adding operators or identifiers as well.
So, we will need different protection techniques.
In general, such a protection approach is based on whitelisting.
In this case, every dynamic parameter should be hardcoded in your script and chosen from that set.
For example, to do dynamic ordering:
$orders = array("name", "price", "qty"); // Field names
$key = array_search($_GET['sort'], $orders)); // if we have such a name
$orderby = $orders[$key]; // If not, first one will be set automatically.
$query = "SELECT * FROM `table` ORDER BY $orderby"; // Value is safe
To ease the process I wrote a whitelist helper function that does all the job in one line:
$orderby = white_list($_GET['orderby'], "name", ["name","price","qty"], "Invalid field name");
$query = "SELECT * FROM `table` ORDER BY `$orderby`"; // sound and safe
There is another way to secure identifiers - escaping but I rather stick to whitelisting as a more robust and explicit approach. Yet as long as you have an identifier quoted, you can escape the quote character to make it safe. For example, by default for mysql you have to double the quote character to escape it. For other other DBMS escaping rules would be different.
Still, there is an issue with SQL syntax keywords (such as AND, DESC and such), but white-listing seems the only approach in this case.
So, a general recommendation may be phrased as
Any variable that represents an SQL data literal, (or, to put it simply - an SQL string, or a number) must be added through a prepared statement. No Exceptions.
Any other query part, such as an SQL keyword, a table or a field name, or an operator - must be filtered through a white list.
Update
Although there is a general agreement on the best practices regarding SQL injection protection, there are still many bad practices as well. And some of them too deeply rooted in the minds of PHP users. For instance, on this very page there are (although invisible to most visitors) more than 80 deleted answers - all removed by the community due to bad quality or promoting bad and outdated practices. Worse yet, some of the bad answers aren't deleted, but rather prospering.
For example, there(1) are(2) still(3) many(4) answers(5), including the second most upvoted answer suggesting you manual string escaping - an outdated approach that is proven to be insecure.
Or there is a slightly better answer that suggests just another method of string formatting and even boasts it as the ultimate panacea. While of course, it is not. This method is no better than regular string formatting, yet it keeps all its drawbacks: it is applicable to strings only and, like any other manual formatting, it's essentially optional, non-obligatory measure, prone to human error of any sort.
I think that all this because of one very old superstition, supported by such authorities like OWASP or the PHP manual, which proclaims equality between whatever "escaping" and protection from SQL injections.
Regardless of what PHP manual said for ages, *_escape_string by no means makes data safe and never has been intended to. Besides being useless for any SQL part other than string, manual escaping is wrong, because it is manual as opposite to automated.
And OWASP makes it even worse, stressing on escaping user input which is an utter nonsense: there should be no such words in the context of injection protection. Every variable is potentially dangerous - no matter the source! Or, in other words - every variable has to be properly formatted to be put into a query - no matter the source again. It's the destination that matters. The moment a developer starts to separate the sheep from the goats (thinking whether some particular variable is "safe" or not) he/she takes his/her first step towards disaster. Not to mention that even the wording suggests bulk escaping at the entry point, resembling the very magic quotes feature - already despised, deprecated and removed.
So, unlike whatever "escaping", prepared statements is the measure that indeed protects from SQL injection (when applicable).
I'd recommend using PDO (PHP Data Objects) to run parameterized SQL queries.
Not only does this protect against SQL injection, but it also speeds up queries.
And by using PDO rather than mysql_, mysqli_, and pgsql_ functions, you make your application a little more abstracted from the database, in the rare occurrence that you have to switch database providers.
Use PDO and prepared queries.
($conn is a PDO object)
$stmt = $conn->prepare("INSERT INTO tbl VALUES(:id, :name)");
$stmt->bindValue(':id', $id);
$stmt->bindValue(':name', $name);
$stmt->execute();
As you can see, people suggest you use prepared statements at the most. It's not wrong, but when your query is executed just once per process, there would be a slight performance penalty.
I was facing this issue, but I think I solved it in very sophisticated way - the way hackers use to avoid using quotes. I used this in conjunction with emulated prepared statements. I use it to prevent all kinds of possible SQL injection attacks.
My approach:
If you expect input to be integer make sure it's really integer. In a variable-type language like PHP it is this very important. You can use for example this very simple but powerful solution: sprintf("SELECT 1,2,3 FROM table WHERE 4 = %u", $input);
If you expect anything else from integer hex it. If you hex it, you will perfectly escape all input. In C/C++ there's a function called mysql_hex_string(), in PHP you can use bin2hex().
Don't worry about that the escaped string will have a 2x size of its original length because even if you use mysql_real_escape_string, PHP has to allocate same capacity ((2*input_length)+1), which is the same.
This hex method is often used when you transfer binary data, but I see no reason why not use it on all data to prevent SQL injection attacks. Note that you have to prepend data with 0x or use the MySQL function UNHEX instead.
So, for example, the query:
SELECT password FROM users WHERE name = 'root';
Will become:
SELECT password FROM users WHERE name = 0x726f6f74;
or
SELECT password FROM users WHERE name = UNHEX('726f6f74');
Hex is the perfect escape. No way to inject.
Difference between UNHEX function and 0x prefix
There was some discussion in comments, so I finally want to make it clear. These two approaches are very similar, but they are a little different in some ways:
The 0x prefix can only be used for data columns such as char, varchar, text, block, binary, etc.
Also, its use is a little complicated if you are about to insert an empty string. You'll have to entirely replace it with '', or you'll get an error.
UNHEX() works on any column; you do not have to worry about the empty string.
Hex methods are often used as attacks
Note that this hex method is often used as an SQL injection attack where integers are just like strings and escaped just with mysql_real_escape_string. Then you can avoid the use of quotes.
For example, if you just do something like this:
"SELECT title FROM article WHERE id = " . mysql_real_escape_string($_GET["id"])
an attack can inject you very easily. Consider the following injected code returned from your script:
SELECT ... WHERE id = -1 UNION ALL SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables;
and now just extract table structure:
SELECT ... WHERE id = -1 UNION ALL SELECT column_name FROM information_schema.column WHERE table_name = __0x61727469636c65__;
And then just select whatever data ones want. Isn't it cool?
But if the coder of an injectable site would hex it, no injection would be possible because the query would look like this:
SELECT ... WHERE id = UNHEX('2d312075...3635');
Deprecated Warning:
This answer's sample code (like the question's sample code) uses PHP's MySQL extension, which was deprecated in PHP 5.5.0 and removed entirely in PHP 7.0.0.
Security Warning: This answer is not in line with security best practices. Escaping is inadequate to prevent SQL injection, use prepared statements instead. Use the strategy outlined below at your own risk. (Also, mysql_real_escape_string() was removed in PHP 7.)
IMPORTANT
The best way to prevent SQL Injection is to use Prepared Statements instead of escaping, as the accepted answer demonstrates.
There are libraries such as Aura.Sql and EasyDB that allow developers to use prepared statements easier. To learn more about why prepared statements are better at stopping SQL injection, refer to this mysql_real_escape_string() bypass and recently fixed Unicode SQL Injection vulnerabilities in WordPress.
Injection prevention - mysql_real_escape_string()
PHP has a specially-made function to prevent these attacks. All you need to do is use the mouthful of a function, mysql_real_escape_string.
mysql_real_escape_string takes a string that is going to be used in a MySQL query and return the same string with all SQL injection attempts safely escaped. Basically, it will replace those troublesome quotes(') a user might enter with a MySQL-safe substitute, an escaped quote \'.
NOTE: you must be connected to the database to use this function!
// Connect to MySQL
$name_bad = "' OR 1'";
$name_bad = mysql_real_escape_string($name_bad);
$query_bad = "SELECT * FROM customers WHERE username = '$name_bad'";
echo "Escaped Bad Injection: <br />" . $query_bad . "<br />";
$name_evil = "'; DELETE FROM customers WHERE 1 or username = '";
$name_evil = mysql_real_escape_string($name_evil);
$query_evil = "SELECT * FROM customers WHERE username = '$name_evil'";
echo "Escaped Evil Injection: <br />" . $query_evil;
You can find more details in MySQL - SQL Injection Prevention.
Security Warning: This answer is not in line with security best practices. Escaping is inadequate to prevent SQL injection, use prepared statements instead. Use the strategy outlined below at your own risk.
You could do something basic like this:
$safe_variable = mysqli_real_escape_string($dbConnection, $_POST["user-input"]);
mysqli_query($dbConnection, "INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES ('" . $safe_variable . "')");
This won't solve every problem, but it's a very good stepping stone. I left out obvious items such as checking the variable's existence, format (numbers, letters, etc.).
Whatever you do end up using, make sure that you check your input hasn't already been mangled by magic_quotes or some other well-meaning rubbish, and if necessary, run it through stripslashes or whatever to sanitize it.
Deprecated Warning:
This answer's sample code (like the question's sample code) uses PHP's MySQL extension, which was deprecated in PHP 5.5.0 and removed entirely in PHP 7.0.0.
Security Warning: This answer is not in line with security best practices. Escaping is inadequate to prevent SQL injection, use prepared statements instead. Use the strategy outlined below at your own risk. (Also, mysql_real_escape_string() was removed in PHP 7.)
Parameterized query AND input validation is the way to go. There are many scenarios under which SQL injection may occur, even though mysql_real_escape_string() has been used.
Those examples are vulnerable to SQL injection:
$offset = isset($_GET['o']) ? $_GET['o'] : 0;
$offset = mysql_real_escape_string($offset);
RunQuery("SELECT userid, username FROM sql_injection_test LIMIT $offset, 10");
or
$order = isset($_GET['o']) ? $_GET['o'] : 'userid';
$order = mysql_real_escape_string($order);
RunQuery("SELECT userid, username FROM sql_injection_test ORDER BY `$order`");
In both cases, you can't use ' to protect the encapsulation.
Source: The Unexpected SQL Injection (When Escaping Is Not Enough)
In my opinion, the best way to generally prevent SQL injection in your PHP application (or any web application, for that matter) is to think about your application's architecture. If the only way to protect against SQL injection is to remember to use a special method or function that does The Right Thing every time you talk to the database, you are doing it wrong. That way, it's just a matter of time until you forget to correctly format your query at some point in your code.
Adopting the MVC pattern and a framework like CakePHP or CodeIgniter is probably the right way to go: Common tasks like creating secure database queries have been solved and centrally implemented in such frameworks. They help you to organize your web application in a sensible way and make you think more about loading and saving objects than about securely constructing single SQL queries.
There are many ways of preventing SQL injections and other SQL hacks. You can easily find it on the Internet (Google Search). Of course PDO is one of the good solutions. But I would like to suggest you some good links prevention from SQL injection.
What is SQL injection and how to prevent
PHP manual for SQL injection
Microsoft explanation of SQL injection and prevention in PHP
And some other like Preventing SQL injection with MySQL and PHP.
Now, why you do you need to prevent your query from SQL injection?
I would like to let you know: Why do we try for preventing SQL injection with a short example below:
Query for login authentication match:
$query="select * from users where email='".$_POST['email']."' and password='".$_POST['password']."' ";
Now, if someone (a hacker) puts
$_POST['email']= admin#emali.com' OR '1=1
and password anything....
The query will be parsed into the system only up to:
$query="select * from users where email='admin#emali.com' OR '1=1';
The other part will be discarded. So, what will happen? A non-authorized user (hacker) will be able to log in as administrator without having his/her password. Now, he/she can do anything that the administrator/email person can do. See, it's very dangerous if SQL injection is not prevented.
I favor stored procedures (MySQL has had stored procedures support since 5.0) from a security point of view - the advantages are -
Most databases (including MySQL) enable user access to be restricted to executing stored procedures. The fine-grained security access control is useful to prevent escalation of privileges attacks. This prevents compromised applications from being able to run SQL directly against the database.
They abstract the raw SQL query from the application so less information of the database structure is available to the application. This makes it harder for people to understand the underlying structure of the database and design suitable attacks.
They accept only parameters, so the advantages of parameterized queries are there. Of course - IMO you still need to sanitize your input - especially if you are using dynamic SQL inside the stored procedure.
The disadvantages are -
They (stored procedures) are tough to maintain and tend to multiply very quickly. This makes managing them an issue.
They are not very suitable for dynamic queries - if they are built to accept dynamic code as parameters then a lot of the advantages are negated.
I think if someone wants to use PHP and MySQL or some other dataBase server:
Think about learning PDO (PHP Data Objects) – it is a database access layer providing a uniform method of access to multiple databases.
Think about learning MySQLi
Libraries examples:
---- PDO
----- No placeholders - ripe for SQL injection! It's bad
$request = $pdoConnection->("INSERT INTO parents (name, addr, city) values ($name, $addr, $city)");
----- Unnamed placeholders
$request = $pdoConnection->("INSERT INTO parents (name, addr, city) values (?, ?, ?);
----- Named placeholders
$request = $pdoConnection->("INSERT INTO parents (name, addr, city) value (:name, :addr, :city)");
--- MySQLi
$request = $mysqliConnection->prepare('
SELECT * FROM trainers
WHERE name = ?
AND email = ?
AND last_login > ?');
$query->bind_param('first_param', 'second_param', $mail, time() - 3600);
$query->execute();
P.S:
PDO wins this battle with ease. With support for twelve
different database drivers and named parameters, we can get used to its API. From a security standpoint, both of them are safe as long as the developer uses them the way they are supposed to be used
If possible, cast the types of your parameters. But it's only working on simple types like int, bool, and float.
$unsafe_variable = $_POST['user_id'];
$safe_variable = (int)$unsafe_variable ;
mysqli_query($conn, "INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES ('" . $safe_variable . "')");
For those unsure of how to use PDO (coming from the mysql_ functions), I made a very, very simple PDO wrapper that is a single file. It exists to show how easy it is to do all the common things applications need to be done. Works with PostgreSQL, MySQL, and SQLite.
Basically, read it while you read the manual to see how to put the PDO functions to use in real life to make it simple to store and retrieve values in the format you want.
I want a single column
$count = DB::column('SELECT COUNT(*) FROM `user`');
I want an array(key => value) results (i.e. for making a selectbox)
$pairs = DB::pairs('SELECT `id`, `username` FROM `user`');
I want a single row result
$user = DB::row('SELECT * FROM `user` WHERE `id` = ?', array($user_id));
I want an array of results
$banned_users = DB::fetch('SELECT * FROM `user` WHERE `banned` = ?', array('TRUE'));
Security Warning: This answer is not in line with security best practices. Escaping is inadequate to prevent SQL injection, use prepared statements instead.
A few guidelines for escaping special characters in SQL statements.
Don't use MySQL. This extension is deprecated. Use MySQLi or PDO instead.
MySQLi
For manually escaping special characters in a string you can use the mysqli_real_escape_string function. The function will not work properly unless the correct character set is set with mysqli_set_charset.
Example:
$mysqli = new mysqli('host', 'user', 'password', 'database');
$mysqli->set_charset('charset');
$string = $mysqli->real_escape_string($string);
$mysqli->query("INSERT INTO table (column) VALUES ('$string')");
For automatic escaping of values with prepared statements, use mysqli_prepare, and mysqli_stmt_bind_param where types for the corresponding bind variables must be provided for an appropriate conversion:
Example:
$stmt = $mysqli->prepare("INSERT INTO table (column1, column2) VALUES (?,?)");
$stmt->bind_param("is", $integer, $string);
$stmt->execute();
No matter if you use prepared statements or mysqli_real_escape_string, you always have to know the type of input data you're working with.
So if you use a prepared statement, you must specify the types of the variables for mysqli_stmt_bind_param function.
And the use of mysqli_real_escape_string is for, as the name says, escaping special characters in a string, so it will not make integers safe. The purpose of this function is to prevent breaking the strings in SQL statements, and the damage to the database that it could cause. mysqli_real_escape_string is a useful function when used properly, especially when combined with sprintf.
Example:
$string = "x' OR name LIKE '%John%";
$integer = '5 OR id != 0';
$query = sprintf( "SELECT id, email, pass, name FROM members WHERE email ='%s' AND id = %d", $mysqli->real_escape_string($string), $integer);
echo $query;
// SELECT id, email, pass, name FROM members WHERE email ='x\' OR name LIKE \'%John%' AND id = 5
$integer = '99999999999999999999';
$query = sprintf("SELECT id, email, pass, name FROM members WHERE email ='%s' AND id = %d", $mysqli->real_escape_string($string), $integer);
echo $query;
// SELECT id, email, pass, name FROM members WHERE email ='x\' OR name LIKE \'%John%' AND id = 2147483647
Security Warning: This answer is not in line with security best practices. Escaping is inadequate to prevent SQL injection, use prepared statements instead. Use the strategy outlined below at your own risk. (Also, mysql_real_escape_string() was removed in PHP 7.)
Warning: The mysql extension is removed at this time. we recommend using the PDO extension
Using this PHP function mysql_escape_string() you can get a good prevention in a fast way.
For example:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '".mysql_escape_string($name_from_html_form)."'
mysql_escape_string — Escapes a string for use in a mysql_query
For more prevention, you can add at the end ...
wHERE 1=1 or LIMIT 1
Finally you get:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '".mysql_escape_string($name_from_html_form)."' LIMIT 1
The simple alternative to this problem could be solved by granting appropriate permissions in the database itself.
For example: if you are using a MySQL database then enter into the database through terminal or the UI provided and just follow this command:
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, DELETE ON database TO username#'localhost' IDENTIFIED BY 'password';
This will restrict the user to only get confined with the specified query's only. Remove the delete permission and so the data would never get deleted from the query fired from the PHP page.
The second thing to do is to flush the privileges so that the MySQL refreshes the permissions and updates.
FLUSH PRIVILEGES;
more information about flush.
To see the current privileges for the user fire the following query.
select * from mysql.user where User='username';
Learn more about GRANT.
Regarding many useful answers, I hope to add some value to this thread.
SQL injection is an attack that can be done through user inputs (inputs that filled by a user and then used inside queries). The SQL injection patterns are correct query syntax while we can call it: bad queries for bad reasons, and we assume that there might be a bad person that try to get secret information (bypassing access control) that affect the three principles of security (confidentiality, integrity, and availability).
Now, our point is to prevent security threats such as SQL injection attacks, the question asking (how to prevent an SQL injection attack using PHP), be more realistic, data filtering or clearing input data is the case when using user-input data inside such query, using PHP or any other programming language is not the case, or as recommended by more people to use modern technology such as prepared statement or any other tools that currently supporting SQL injection prevention, consider that these tools not available anymore? How do you secure your application?
My approach against SQL injection is: clearing user-input data before sending it to the database (before using it inside any query).
Data filtering for (converting unsafe data to safe data)
Consider that PDO and MySQLi are not available. How can you secure your application? Do you force me to use them? What about other languages other than PHP? I prefer to provide general ideas as it can be used for wider border, not just for a specific language.
SQL user (limiting user privilege): most common SQL operations are (SELECT, UPDATE, INSERT), then, why give the UPDATE privilege to a user that does not require it? For example, login, and search pages are only using SELECT, then, why use DB users in these pages with high privileges?
RULE: do not create one database user for all privileges. For all SQL operations, you can create your scheme like (deluser, selectuser, updateuser) as usernames for easy usage.
See principle of least privilege.
Data filtering: before building any query user input, it should be validated and filtered. For programmers, it's important to define some properties for each user-input variables:
data type, data pattern, and data length. A field that is a number between (x and y) must be exactly validated using the exact rule, and for a field that is a string (text): pattern is the case, for example, a username must contain only some characters, let’s say [a-zA-Z0-9_-.]. The length varies between (x and n) where x and n (integers, x <=n).
Rule: creating exact filters and validation rules are best practices for me.
Use other tools: Here, I will also agree with you that a prepared statement (parametrized query) and stored procedures. The disadvantages here is these ways require advanced skills which do not exist for most users. The basic idea here is to distinguish between the SQL query and the data that is used inside. Both approaches can be used even with unsafe data, because the user-input data here does not add anything to the original query, such as (any or x=x).
For more information, please read OWASP SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet.
Now, if you are an advanced user, start using this defense as you like, but, for beginners, if they can't quickly implement a stored procedure and prepared the statement, it's better to filter input data as much they can.
Finally, let's consider that a user sends this text below instead of entering his/her username:
[1] UNION SELECT IF(SUBSTRING(Password,1,1)='2',BENCHMARK(100000,SHA1(1)),0) User,Password FROM mysql.user WHERE User = 'root'
This input can be checked early without any prepared statement and stored procedures, but to be on the safe side, using them starts after user-data filtering and validation.
The last point is detecting unexpected behavior which requires more effort and complexity; it's not recommended for normal web applications.
Unexpected behavior in the above user input is SELECT, UNION, IF, SUBSTRING, BENCHMARK, SHA, and root. Once these words detected, you can avoid the input.
UPDATE 1:
A user commented that this post is useless, OK! Here is what OWASP.ORG provided:
Primary defenses:
Option #1: Use of Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries)
Option #2: Use of Stored Procedures
Option #3: Escaping all User Supplied Input
Additional defenses:
Also Enforce: Least Privilege
Also Perform: White List Input Validation
As you may know, claiming an article should be supported by a valid argument, at least by one reference! Otherwise, it's considered as an attack and a bad claim!
Update 2:
From the PHP manual, PHP: Prepared Statements - Manual:
Escaping and SQL injection
Bound variables will be escaped automatically by the server. The
server inserts their escaped values at the appropriate places into the
statement template before execution. A hint must be provided to the
server for the type of bound variable, to create an appropriate
conversion. See the mysqli_stmt_bind_param() function for more
information.
The automatic escaping of values within the server is sometimes
considered a security feature to prevent SQL injection. The same
degree of security can be achieved with non-prepared statements if
input values are escaped correctly.
Update 3:
I created test cases for knowing how PDO and MySQLi send the query to the MySQL server when using a prepared statement:
PDO:
$user = "''1''"; // Malicious keyword
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM awa_user WHERE userame =:username';
$sth = $dbh->prepare($sql, array(PDO::ATTR_CURSOR => PDO::CURSOR_FWDONLY));
$sth->execute(array(':username' => $user));
Query Log:
189 Query SELECT * FROM awa_user WHERE userame ='\'\'1\'\''
189 Quit
MySQLi:
$stmt = $mysqli->prepare("SELECT * FROM awa_user WHERE username =?")) {
$stmt->bind_param("s", $user);
$user = "''1''";
$stmt->execute();
Query Log:
188 Prepare SELECT * FROM awa_user WHERE username =?
188 Execute SELECT * FROM awa_user WHERE username ='\'\'1\'\''
188 Quit
It's clear that a prepared statement is also escaping the data, nothing else.
As also mentioned in the above statement,
The automatic escaping of values within the server is sometimes considered a security feature to prevent SQL injection. The same degree of security can be achieved with non-prepared statements, if input values are escaped correctly
Therefore, this proves that data validation such as intval() is a good idea for integer values before sending any query. In addition, preventing malicious user data before sending the query is a correct and valid approach.
Please see this question for more detail: PDO sends raw query to MySQL while Mysqli sends prepared query, both produce the same result
References:
SQL Injection Cheat Sheet
SQL Injection
Information security
Security Principles
Data validation
Security Warning: This answer is not in line with security best practices. Escaping is inadequate to prevent SQL injection, use prepared statements instead. Use the strategy outlined below at your own risk. (Also, mysql_real_escape_string() was removed in PHP 7.)
Deprecated Warning: The mysql extension is deprecated at this time. we recommend using the PDO extension
I use three different ways to prevent my web application from being vulnerable to SQL injection.
Use of mysql_real_escape_string(), which is a pre-defined function in PHP, and this code add backslashes to the following characters: \x00, \n, \r, \, ', " and \x1a. Pass the input values as parameters to minimize the chance of SQL injection.
The most advanced way is to use PDOs.
I hope this will help you.
Consider the following query:
$iId = mysql_real_escape_string("1 OR 1=1");
$sSql = "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id = $iId";
mysql_real_escape_string() will not protect here. If you use single quotes (' ') around your variables inside your query is what protects you against this. Here is an solution below for this:
$iId = (int) mysql_real_escape_string("1 OR 1=1");
$sSql = "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id = $iId";
This question has some good answers about this.
I suggest, using PDO is the best option.
Edit:
mysql_real_escape_string() is deprecated as of PHP 5.5.0. Use either mysqli or PDO.
An alternative to mysql_real_escape_string() is
string mysqli_real_escape_string ( mysqli $link , string $escapestr )
Example:
$iId = $mysqli->real_escape_string("1 OR 1=1");
$mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM table WHERE id = $iId");
A simple way would be to use a PHP framework like CodeIgniter or Laravel which have inbuilt features like filtering and active-record so that you don't have to worry about these nuances.
Warning: the approach described in this answer only applies to very specific scenarios and isn't secure since SQL injection attacks do not only rely on being able to inject X=Y.
If the attackers are trying to hack into the form via PHP's $_GET variable or with the URL's query string, you would be able to catch them if they're not secure.
RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} ([0-9]+)=([0-9]+)
RewriteRule ^(.*) ^/track.php
Because 1=1, 2=2, 1=2, 2=1, 1+1=2, etc... are the common questions to an SQL database of an attacker. Maybe also it's used by many hacking applications.
But you must be careful, that you must not rewrite a safe query from your site. The code above is giving you a tip, to rewrite or redirect (it depends on you) that hacking-specific dynamic query string into a page that will store the attacker's IP address, or EVEN THEIR COOKIES, history, browser, or any other sensitive information, so you can deal with them later by banning their account or contacting authorities.
A good idea is to use an object-relational mapper like Idiorm:
$user = ORM::for_table('user')
->where_equal('username', 'j4mie')
->find_one();
$user->first_name = 'Jamie';
$user->save();
$tweets = ORM::for_table('tweet')
->select('tweet.*')
->join('user', array(
'user.id', '=', 'tweet.user_id'
))
->where_equal('user.username', 'j4mie')
->find_many();
foreach ($tweets as $tweet) {
echo $tweet->text;
}
It not only saves you from SQL injections, but from syntax errors too! It also supports collections of models with method chaining to filter or apply actions to multiple results at once and multiple connections.
There are so many answers for PHP and MySQL, but here is code for PHP and Oracle for preventing SQL injection as well as regular use of oci8 drivers:
$conn = oci_connect($username, $password, $connection_string);
$stmt = oci_parse($conn, 'UPDATE table SET field = :xx WHERE ID = 123');
oci_bind_by_name($stmt, ':xx', $fieldval);
oci_execute($stmt);
This post is marked obsolete because the content is out of date. It is not currently accepting new interactions.
Deprecated Warning:
This answer's sample code (like the question's sample code) uses PHP's MySQL extension, which was deprecated in PHP 5.5.0 and removed entirely in PHP 7.0.0.
Security Warning: This answer is not in line with security best practices. Escaping is inadequate to prevent SQL injection, use prepared statements instead. Use the strategy outlined below at your own risk. (Also, mysql_real_escape_string() was removed in PHP 7.)
Using PDO and MYSQLi is a good practice to prevent SQL injections, but if you really want to work with MySQL functions and queries, it would be better to use
mysql_real_escape_string
$unsafe_variable = mysql_real_escape_string($_POST['user_input']);
There are more abilities to prevent this: like identify - if the input is a string, number, char or array, there are so many inbuilt functions to detect this. Also, it would be better to use these functions to check input data.
is_string
$unsafe_variable = (is_string($_POST['user_input']) ? $_POST['user_input'] : '');
is_numeric
$unsafe_variable = (is_numeric($_POST['user_input']) ? $_POST['user_input'] : '');
And it is so much better to use those functions to check input data with mysql_real_escape_string.
I've written this little function several years ago:
function sqlvprintf($query, $args)
{
global $DB_LINK;
$ctr = 0;
ensureConnection(); // Connect to database if not connected already.
$values = array();
foreach ($args as $value)
{
if (is_string($value))
{
$value = "'" . mysqli_real_escape_string($DB_LINK, $value) . "'";
}
else if (is_null($value))
{
$value = 'NULL';
}
else if (!is_int($value) && !is_float($value))
{
die('Only numeric, string, array and NULL arguments allowed in a query. Argument '.($ctr+1).' is not a basic type, it\'s type is '. gettype($value). '.');
}
$values[] = $value;
$ctr++;
}
$query = preg_replace_callback(
'/{(\\d+)}/',
function($match) use ($values)
{
if (isset($values[$match[1]]))
{
return $values[$match[1]];
}
else
{
return $match[0];
}
},
$query
);
return $query;
}
function runEscapedQuery($preparedQuery /*, ...*/)
{
$params = array_slice(func_get_args(), 1);
$results = runQuery(sqlvprintf($preparedQuery, $params)); // Run query and fetch results.
return $results;
}
This allows running statements in an one-liner C#-ish String.Format like:
runEscapedQuery("INSERT INTO Whatever (id, foo, bar) VALUES ({0}, {1}, {2})", $numericVar, $stringVar1, $stringVar2);
It escapes considering the variable type. If you try to parameterize table, column names, it would fail as it puts every string in quotes which is an invalid syntax.
SECURITY UPDATE: The previous str_replace version allowed injections by adding {#} tokens into user data. This preg_replace_callback version doesn't cause problems if the replacement contains these tokens.

Preventing SQL injection in Node.js

Is it possible to prevent SQL injections in Node.js (preferably with a module) in the same way that PHP had Prepared Statements that protected against them.
If so, how? If not, what are some examples that might bypass the code I've provided (see below).
Some Context:
I'm making a web application with a back-end stack consisting of Node.js + MySql using the node-mysql module. From a usability perspective, the module is great, but it has not yet implemented something akin to PHP's Prepared Statements (though I'm aware it is on the todo).
From my understanding, PHP's implementation of prepared statements, among other things, helped greatly in the prevention of SQL injections. I'm worried, though, that my node.js app may be open to similar attacks, even with the string escaping provided by default (as in the code snippet below).
node-mysql seems to be the most popular mysql connector for node.js, so I was wondering what other people might be doing (if anything) to account for this issue - or if it is even an issue with node.js to begin with (not sure how this wouldn't be, since user/client-side input is involved).
Should I switch to node-mysql-native for the time being, since it does provide prepared statements? I'm hesitant to do this, because it does not seem to be as active as node-mysql (though that may just mean that it is complete).
Here is a snippet of user registration code, which uses the sanitizer module, along with node-mysql's prepared statement-like syntax (which, as I mentioned above, does character escaping), to prevent cross site scripting and sql injections, respectively:
// Prevent xss
var clean_user = sanitizer.sanitize(username);
// assume password is hashed already
var post = {Username: clean_user, Password: hash};
// This just uses connection.escape() underneath
var query = connection.query('INSERT INTO users SET ?', post,
function(err, results)
{
// Can a Sql injection happen here?
});
The node-mysql library automatically performs escaping when used as you are already doing. See https://github.com/felixge/node-mysql#escaping-query-values
The library has a section in the readme about escaping. It's Javascript-native, so I do not suggest switching to node-mysql-native. The documentation states these guidelines for escaping:
Edit: node-mysql-native is also a pure-Javascript solution.
Numbers are left untouched
Booleans are converted to true / false strings
Date objects are converted to YYYY-mm-dd HH:ii:ss strings
Buffers are converted to hex strings, e.g. X'0fa5'
Strings are safely escaped
Arrays are turned into list, e.g. ['a', 'b'] turns into 'a', 'b'
Nested arrays are turned into grouped lists (for bulk inserts), e.g. [['a', 'b'], ['c', 'd']] turns into ('a', 'b'), ('c', 'd')
Objects are turned into key = 'val' pairs. Nested objects are cast to strings.
undefined / null are converted to NULL
NaN / Infinity are left as-is. MySQL does not support these, and trying to insert them as values will trigger MySQL errors until they implement support.
This allows for you to do things like so:
var userId = 5;
var query = connection.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', [userId], function(err, results) {
//query.sql returns SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '5'
});
As well as this:
var post = {id: 1, title: 'Hello MySQL'};
var query = connection.query('INSERT INTO posts SET ?', post, function(err, result) {
//query.sql returns INSERT INTO posts SET `id` = 1, `title` = 'Hello MySQL'
});
Aside from those functions, you can also use the escape functions:
connection.escape(query);
mysql.escape(query);
To escape query identifiers:
mysql.escapeId(identifier);
And as a response to your comment on prepared statements:
From a usability perspective, the module is great, but it has not yet implemented something akin to PHP's Prepared Statements.
The prepared statements are on the todo list for this connector, but this module at least allows you to specify custom formats that can be very similar to prepared statements. Here's an example from the readme:
connection.config.queryFormat = function (query, values) {
if (!values) return query;
return query.replace(/\:(\w+)/g, function (txt, key) {
if (values.hasOwnProperty(key)) {
return this.escape(values[key]);
}
return txt;
}.bind(this));
};
This changes the query format of the connection so you can use queries like this:
connection.query("UPDATE posts SET title = :title", { title: "Hello MySQL" });
//equivalent to
connection.query("UPDATE posts SET title = " + mysql.escape("Hello MySQL");
In regards to testing if a module you are utilizing is secure or not there are several routes you can take. I will touch on the pros/cons of each so you can make a more informed decision.
Currently, there aren't any vulnerabilities for the module you are utilizing, however, this can often lead to a false sense of security as there very well could be a vulnerability currently exploiting the module/software package you are using and you wouldn't be alerted to a problem until the vendor applies a fix/patch.
To keep abreast of vulnerabilities you will need to follow mailing lists, forums, IRC & other hacking related discussions.
PRO: You can often times you will become aware of potential problems within a library before a vendor has been alerted or has issued a fix/patch to remedy the potential avenue of attack on their software.
CON: This can be very time consuming and resource intensive. If you do go this route a bot using RSS feeds, log parsing (IRC chat logs) and or a web scraper using key phrases (in this case node-mysql-native) and notifications can help reduce time spent trolling these resources.
Create a fuzzer, use a fuzzer or other vulnerability framework such as metasploit, sqlMap etc. to help test for problems that the vendor may not have looked for.
PRO: This can prove to be a sure fire method of ensuring to an acceptable level whether or not the module/software you are implementing is safe for public access.
CON: This also becomes time consuming and costly. The other problem will stem from false positives as well as uneducated review of the results where a problem resides but is not noticed.
Really security, and application security in general can be very time consuming and resource intensive. One thing managers will always use is a formula to determine the cost effectiveness (manpower, resources, time, pay etc) of performing the above two options.
Anyways, I realize this is not a 'yes' or 'no' answer that may have been hoping for but I don't think anyone can give that to you until they perform an analysis of the software in question.
Mysql-native has been outdated so it became MySQL2 that is a new module created with the help of the original MySQL module's team. This module has more features and I think it has what you want as it has prepared statements(by using.execute()) like in PHP for more security.
It's also very active(the last change was from 2-1 days) I didn't try it before but I think it's what you want and more.
Preventing SQL injections
SQL injections is a common web hacking technique to destroy or misuse your database. To prevent SQL injections, you should use escape the values when query values are variables provided by the user.
Escape query values by using the mysql.escape() method:
var adr = 'Mountain 21';
var sql = 'SELECT * FROM customers WHERE address = ' + mysql.escape(adr);
con.query(sql, function (err, result) {
if (err) throw err;
console.log(result);
});
Escape query values by using the placeholder ? method:
var adr = 'Mountain 21';
var sql = 'SELECT * FROM customers WHERE address = ?';
con.query(sql, [adr], function (err, result) {
if (err) throw err;
console.log(result);
});
More Detail

Trying to build a map/hashmap in javascript

I'm trying to run a query in javascript and pass the results to other querys to pull more data. I also want to be able to display this data all in one table so I'm trying to get the results arranged in a javascript map but I seem to be having issues.
This is being built inside of salesforce.com with their AJAX toolkit
The code I have is...
var cn = Query("select id, LastName, FirstName, Middle_Name__c, Gender__c, HomePhone, Birthdate, Birth_City__c," +
"Birth_Country__c, SSN_Encrypted__c, Provider_NPI_ID__c, Primary_Specialty__c," +
"Practicing_Specialty__c, Title, GlobalProviderID__c from contact where Name like " +
"'%" + sBox + "%'");
var PFA;
for (var i = 0; i < cn.length; i++) {
var x = new Array();
var PFA = Query("select id, First_Scheduled_Date__c, Region__c " +
"from Provider_Facility_Associations__c where Provider__c='" + cn[i].Id + "'");
m['cn'] = cn[i];
m['PFA'] = PFA;
m[i] = x;
}
console.log(m['cn']);
Any help would be greatly appreciated.
You can use a basic javascript object as a map.
So
var map = {};
map["key1"] ="value1"
map["key2"] = "value2"
will create an object like this:
map = {
key1:"value1",
key2:"value2"
}
When you pass an integer i to your m object it will try to treat it as an array though rather than an object.
You have deeper issues than this though since you should not be running SQL queries from javascript. That will allow anyone to run arbitrary queries on your database when accessing your website.
Please read up about how relationships work in Salesforce and their specific "joins" that look weird at the beginning but actually save your bacon many many times in common development situations like that.
SELECT Id, FirstName, LastName,
(SELECT Id, First_Scheduled_Date__c, Region__c
FROM Provider_Facility_Associations__r)
FROM contact
WHERE Name LIKE '%Smith%'
(note the "__r" in the "subquery")
This will give you Contacts and each of them will have a "field" called Provider_Facility_Associations__r that will be an array of items (or just empty array if nothing found).
Salesforce security model is not a silver bullet, you should worry about performance and SQL injections. People can't use them to delete stuff they shouldn't but they can learn information you didn't intend to expose.
Last but not least - this will perform better and be more secure if you'd have the query server side and just pass the variable (part of contact's name) there. This can be apex exposed as webservice or if you're in Visualforce - action function, JavaScript remoting... There are plenty of options!
I'm not saying the AJAX toolkit is an abomination... But it should be used very rarely if at all. It's an artifact from so-called SControl days and with introduction of Visualforce (hmm... 4 years now?) many of it's use cases can be done faster & in more secure way.
Running SQL from JS is a bad idea usually unless you are using a sql-lite localstorage engine of some sort. Anyways, I believe your problem may be that your m's and x's are mixed up. Also, running queries in a for loop where using an IN in the second query or a JOIN and just doing one query would probably be better.

Creating a BIRT Data Set with Dynamic Data - ORA-01722

Having some trouble getting BIRT to allow me to create a Data Set with Parameters that are set at run time.
The SQL that is giving me the error is:
...
FROM SPRIDEN, SPBPERS P, POSNCTL.NBRJOBS X, NHRDIST d1
where D1.NHRDIST_PAYNO between '#PAYNO_BEGIN' and '#PAYNO_BEGIN'
AND D1.NHRDIST_YEAR = '#YEAR'
...
I have my Report Parameters defined as PaynoBegin, PaynoEnd, Year
I also have a Data Set script set for beforeOpen as follows:
queryText = String (queryText).replace ("#PAYNO_END", Number(params["PaynoEnd"]));
queryText = String (queryText).replace ("#PAYNO_BEGIN", Number(params["PaynoBegin"]));
queryText = String (queryText).replace ("#YEAR", Number(params["Year"]));
The problem seems to be that the JDBC can't get the ResultSet from this, however I have 10 other reports that work the same way. I have commented out the where clause and it will generate the data set. I also tried breaking the where clause out into two and clauses with <= and >=, but it still throws a ORA-01722 invalid number error on the line.
Any thoughts on this?
Two quite separate thoughts:
1) You have single quotes around each of your parameters in the query, yet it appears as though each one is a numeric - try removing the single quotes, so that the where clause looks like this:
where D1.NHRDIST_PAYNO between #PAYNO_BEGIN and #PAYNO_BEGIN
AND D1.NHRDIST_YEAR = #YEAR
Don't forget that all three parameters should be required. If the query still returns an error, try replacing #PAYNO_BEGIN, #PAYNO_BEGIN and #YEAR with hardcoded numeric values in the query string, and see whether you still get an error.
2) You are currently using dynamic SQL - amending query strings to replace specified markers with the text of the entered parameters. This makes you vulnerable to SQL Injection attacks - if you are unfamiliar with the term, you can find a simple example here.
If you are familiar with the concept, you may be under the impression that SQL Injection attacks cannot be implemented with numeric parameters - Tom Kite has recently posted a few articles on his blog about SQL Injection, including one that deals with a SQL Injection flaw using NLS settings with numbers.
Instead, you should use bind parameters. To do so with your report, amend your query to include:
...
FROM SPRIDEN, SPBPERS P, POSNCTL.NBRJOBS X, NHRDIST d1
where D1.NHRDIST_PAYNO between ? and ?
AND D1.NHRDIST_YEAR = ?
...
instead of the existing code, remove the queryText replacement code from the beforeOpen script and map the three dataset parameters to the PaynoBegin, PaynoEnd and Year report parameters respectively in the Dataset Editor. (You should also change any other replaced text in your query text to bind parameter markers (?) and map dataset parameters to them as required.)

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